

Sacrifice in the Pentateuch: Four Views – Robert S. Kawashima¹

As Wellhausen noted long ago, the Priestly Code, with its detailed account of sacrifice, has furnished “the normative scheme for modern accounts of the matter, into which all the other casual notices of the Old Testament on the subject must be made to fit as best they can.”² In other words, “modern accounts” of biblical sacrifice – based on the not unreasonable assumption that it existed as a “real” set of beliefs and practices in the external world and should therefore be susceptible to a single description as a more or less coherent system – have generally aimed at synthesizing the biblical evidence into a single descriptive whole. As a result, the variety of biblical views of sacrifice – in particular, the distinct sacrificial forms and the corresponding theologies espoused by the four principle Pentateuchal sources – has not received adequate scholarly attention. (Yes, for the next twenty minutes I will ask you to indulge me as I persist in employing the terminology and general coordinates of the “Documentary Hypothesis.”) J, E and P, furthermore, all recount an inaugural act of sacrifice, which thus constitute, I maintain, so many etiologies of sacrifice, that is, narrative accounts of the origin, and therefore nature and function, of sacrifice. While D does not provide an etiology thereof, it too espouses a distinct understanding of sacrifice. And so, by comparing the four sources on this matter, we will be able to articulate more clearly the way each understands the nature and function of sacrifice.

P’s sacrificial system as a whole centers on maintaining the sanctity of the tabernacle and therewith the divine presence housed within. Relatedly, it is divinely revealed, since mere mortals, in P’s view, cannot have invented an efficacious cult on their own. Following Israel Knohl, we can further differentiate within P between two related but distinct views of sacrifice: that of the older core documents he calls the Priestly Torah (PT), and that of the later additions he attributes to the Holiness School (HS).³ PT sees the sacrificial system (and the Law in general) as a set of absolute commands, to be meticulously performed without expectation of rewards or blessings. It is

epitomized by the Day of Atonement rituals (Lev 16), which purified the tabernacle and, by extension, the camp as a whole. But the same general coordinates (sacred and profane, etc.) orientate the entire Priestly source.⁴ What is surprising is that, thanks to HS, the first sacrifice to take place within P's narrative arc is the inaugural passover in Egypt prescribed in Exod 12:1-20,⁵ a remarkable fact calling for interpretation.⁶ The technical terms used clearly demonstrates its sacrificial character: "unblemished" (*tamim*), "slaughtered" (*šahat*), and so forth.⁷ And yet, it is neither performed at the tabernacle, nor supervised by the priests – for obvious reasons. This ritual, thus conforms to Knohl's general characterization of HS as a type of lay movement whose express goal was to popularize esoteric priestly concerns.⁸

One should interpret P's passover, then, in relation to P's sacrificial system, attending in particular to its distinctive ritual procedures: the "whole congregation" of Israel is to "give" (*wenatnu*) the blood of the passover lamb to the two doorposts and the lintel of each house (12:3,7); its "flesh" (*bašar*) must not be "boiled in water" but rather "fire-roasted [*šli-'eš*], its head with its legs and its entrails" (*ro'šo al-kerā'ayw we'al qirbo*; 12:8-9); and whatever remains of the carcass must be "burned with fire" (*ba'eš tišropu*; 12:10). Jacob Milgrom aptly compares the passover to the "thanksgiving" offering (Lev 7:15), the priestly consecration (Lev 8:31-2; Exod 29:34), and the Nazirite's ram offering (Num 6:19, as interpreted by rabbis, *m. Zebah* 5:6): for all four are eaten with bread; they must all be eaten within the day; and with the exception of the priestly consecration, they are eaten by lay persons (1.219f). These parallels, however, fail to account for two crucial peculiarities of P's passover: the configuration in which the slaughtered animal is said to be cooked/burned, and the stipulation that even that portion designated for human consumption must be fire-roasted.

With respect to these two details, the passover most closely resembles the sin offering described in Leviticus 4 for "unwitting" (*bišegagah*) infractions of priestly law (see also Exod 29:14;

Lev 8:14-17; Num 15:22-29). It is divided into four cases. If the “anointed priest” sins, he shall sacrifice a young bull and “give” (wenatan) some of its blood to the horns of the altar (not to mention additional blood rituals); next, the fat, kidneys, and liver are turned into smoke on the altar; finally, its “skin” and “flesh” (bešaro) along with “its head, its legs, its entrails and its dung” (‘al-rošo we‘al-kera‘ayw weqirbo upiršo) are “burned with fire” (wešarap ... ba’es) outside the camp in a “clean place” (Lev 4:2-12).⁹ Likewise the case for the “whole congregation” (4:13-21); likely the case for the ruler (4:22-26) and the common individual (4:27-35), given the elliptical nature of these laws. Only here do we find a configuration of animal parts that explicitly includes and combines those specified in the passover: flesh, head, legs, entrails.¹⁰ These numerous verbal cues point to another parallel in ritual structure. Just as the sin offering’s remains are to be disposed of by being “burned with fire” outside the camp – versus those sacrifices “turned to smoke” (hiqtir) on the altar as a “pleasing odor” (e.g., Lev 1) – so too the passover lamb’s leftovers are to be disposed of by being “burned with fire” (Exod 12:10) – outside the camp, temporally speaking, inasmuch as this passover precedes the camp’s establishment in the wilderness.

In light of these parallels between Exod 12 and Lev 4, I interpret the original passover as a lay “sin offering.” According to Milgrom, the function of the sin offering is to purify the sanctuary through the applying of blood to, and the burning of fat and attendant organs on, the altar, and thereby to effect “forgiveness” for the sacrificer. In just this way, the function of the original passover was to purify the Israelites’ Egyptian homes through the application of blood, and to wipe Israel’s slate clean of the guilt of “unwitting” infractions of God’s law¹¹ – all infractions up to this point being necessarily “unwitting,” inasmuch as the Law had yet to be revealed. In an instructive contrast, JE’s passover (Exod 12:21-39) functions as an apotropaic rite – or better, preserves more clearly the traces of an apotropaic rite. Whereas for P the blood of the passover functions as a “sign” alerting God which houses to “pass over/by” (upasaḥti) as he himself kills all the

firstborn of Egypt (12:13), the blood of JE's passover indicates to Yahweh which houses to protect from an autonomous agent: "and Yahweh will protect [upasaḥ ... 'al] the door and will not allow the destroyer to enter your houses to strike" (12:23). And whereas for P it is the sacrificial meat of the passover lamb that cannot be taken outside the house into profane space (12:46), or remain until the profane time of the following morning (12:10),¹² it is the Israelites themselves, according to JE, who must not cross the threshold (12:22), lest they step beyond the protective boundary of the bloodied doorway. As for the meal itself, I would argue that it constitutes a single and continuous process for disposing of the animal's carcass, for which reason the "flesh" is not to be removed and cooked separately, but remains with "its head with its legs and its entrails."¹³ It is in relation to this ritual disposal, finally, that I interpret the peculiar stipulation that the passover be eaten "fire-roasted," which as Ronald Hendel observes, stands in marked contrast to the general rule that sacrificial meat designated for human consumption be boiled (Lev 6:21[6:28]; Num 6:19).¹⁴ "Fire-roasted" designates the midway point in a ritual of disposal that transforms a raw carcass into ash and smoke.¹⁵

Let us finally consider more closely the fact that the blood of P's passover constitutes a "sign [ʾot] upon [their] houses" (Exod 12:13). As scholars going back to Wellhausen have noted, P conceives of history in terms of four dispensations,¹⁶ the latter three in particular corresponding to three covenants, each under its own "sign": the Noahic covenant between Elohim and "all flesh" under the "sign" of the rainbow (Gen 9:13,17); the Abrahamic covenant between El Shadday and Abraham along with "his seed" under the "sign" of circumcision (Gen 17:11); finally, the Mosaic covenant between Yahweh and Israel.¹⁷ The sign of the third covenant, however, is dual.¹⁸ Discussions of this topic typically emphasize the fact that P designates the sabbath a "sign" of the covenant (Exod 31:17); but one should recall that the blood marking the doorway on the eve of the exodus is also referred to as a "sign" (12:13). I would further point out that the latter occupies

a crucial position within P's narrative arc (Exod 12:13). Just as the Noahic covenant is initiated "in that very day" Noah enters the ark (Gen 7:13), and the Abrahamic covenant is established "in that very day" Abraham circumcises the males of his household (17:23), so the Mosaic covenant is effectively inaugurated "in that very day" the original passover takes place (Exod 12:41). Viewed in this light, one notices that all three covenants involve blood and purity: the Noahic covenant prohibits the consumption of blood; the Abrahamic covenant requires circumcision; the Mosaic covenant begins with the passover. What is more, each covenant is a prerequisite for the next: P's Abraham, I dare say, did not consume blood; and if a resident alien would join Israel in the observance of passover, he must first be circumcised (Exod 12:48f; cf Josh 5).¹⁹ Returning to HS's shocking decision to make a lay ritual the first sacrifice in history, I would invoke that paradox surrounding "the chicken and the egg": Which came first? P needed to resolve similar difficulties in the process of translating cultic structure into narrative sequence.²⁰ HS reinterpreted the passover in Egypt as a type of sin offering that helped make possible Yahweh's redemption of Israel; but the passover necessarily preceded the establishment of the priesthood; thus, the laity themselves, in a paradoxical moment, had to offer this inaugural sacrifice on their own behalf. In a comparable moment in the PT, the ordination of Aaron as the first priest required that someone, who was necessarily not himself a priest, offer the necessary sacrifices – a role conveniently filled by that altogether exceptional figure named Moses (Lev 8-9).

In stark contrast to P,²¹ J views sacrifice as a strictly human invention, one designed to compensate for humanity's alienation from God. Cain and Abel, now Yahweh's neighbors to the east, give the first offerings in J's history by physically carrying material goods to their parents' former master (Gen 4:3-5). J here follows priestly protocol: just as P instructs the Israelites to "bring" their "offering" to the priests at the tabernacle (Lev 2:1-2; 4:14), where the latter would next carry out additional technical rituals, so Cain and Abel each "bring" (hebi') their "offering"

(minḥah) to Yahweh's home (Gen 4:3f). Perhaps just as relevant here is the political version of this ritual act: as when Ehud the judge "brought the offering" or "tribute" (wayyaqreb et-haminḥah) to Eglon, King of Moab (Judg 3:17). However, in contrast to priestly sacrifices and political tributes, which are commanded or demanded by their recipients, Cain and Abel's offerings are not given in response to any divine instruction. Their gesture constitutes, rather, an instance of what anthropologists refer to as "gift exchange." As Marcel Mauss argued in his seminal study thereof, a gift, even when freely given, creates an obligation on the part of the recipient to "return" it in some way.²² In precisely this way, Cain and Abel's offerings were meant to curry divine favor. God's reception of Cain and Abel's gifts is telling: God "has regard" for Abel's offering, but not for Cain's. Cain's visible disappointment, his "fallen face," indicates that some sort of divine approval had been expected (4:5f). The perceived injustice behind the rejection of his own gift, as opposed to his brother's, produces in Cain not only resentment, but violent rage.

Noah will similarly offer the first "burnt offerings" (Gen 8:20-22) at another crucial juncture in history. If Cain and Abel could still deliver their gifts to Yahweh in person, Noah must now attempt to commune with an absent God, who has, it is implied, forsaken earth for heaven in anticipation of the flood. J's Noah, then – like Cain and Abel – is a type of cultic innovator, inventing a new sacrificial technology, namely, the altar, which enables him to turn sacrificial animals into smoke that rises up to God as a "pleasing odor" (8:20-21) – another echo of priestly terminology. God's response is, again, telling: he vows, with the savory aroma of Noah's gifts still in his nostrils, never again to destroy all life on earth, declaring: "For the inclination of the heart of humankind is evil from its youth" (8:22). It is surprising that such a diagnosis of human nature should provide a basis for clemency, being virtually identical to the reason given earlier for all but exterminating everything that breathes: "and every inclination of the thoughts of its heart is only evil all the day" (6:5). But if humans haven't changed, what has? Noah's burnt offerings, it

would seem, have placated God, enabling him to reconcile himself with human foibles. J is thus a veritable humanist, so capacious is his conception of the children of Adam and Eve: they are capable not only of infuriating God, but of disarming him as well. They are endowed, one might say, with those intellectual resources that are the prerogative of beings who are like god, knowing good and of evil.

“The Binding of Isaac” functions as an etiology of sacrifice in the source formerly known as E. It originates in a divine command: “Take, please, your son, your only son, whom you love, Isaac, and go to the land of Moriah, and offer him up there as a burnt offering” (Gen 22:2). But if it resembles the Priestly sacrifices as an obligatory, albeit one-time act, this “burnt offering” neither cleanses nor sanctifies. Rather, it functions as a test, a type of hermeneutical device thanks to which Elohim is able to determine whether or not Abraham is a “fearer of God,” and thus worthy of blessing. In this sense, it has the outward appearance of a gift exchange, not unlike Noah’s burnt offering. Elohim, however, places Abraham under a unilateral obligation, as opposed to a reciprocal exchange. In other words, Abraham’s burnt offering is neither one of his own devising, nor voluntary, nor motivated by hope of reward. It is, rather, one given out of fear and trembling in response to God’s unconditional demand. If Elohim ultimately blesses his fearful servant, this blessing is not a “gift” given in “exchange” for Abraham’s sacrifice, which is not in the end actually sacrificed. Rather, it is an unexpected, nonobligatory reward for Abraham’s blind obedience – or better, for his willingness to obey, his willingness to give up that which is most precious. The promise of blessing is finally fulfilled in his covenant with the nation of Israel, for which reason Exodus 24, which recounts the sacrificial rites atop Mount Horeb that seal this covenant, alludes to Isaac’s near sacrifice in Genesis 22, as Richard Friedman has shown.²³

For E, then, sacrifice is structured not as an exchange, but as a substitution, or more precisely, a “ransom” that rescues human life from death – hence the ram Abraham finally slaughters

in place of his son. True, there is evidence, as Friedman again has shown, that in an earlier version of the story no substitute is offered, so that Abraham must actually go through with the sacrifice.²⁴ Note how Gen 22:15 – “And the Angel of Yahweh called to him a second time from heaven” – looks suspiciously like a resumptive repetition of 22:11 – “And the Angel of Yahweh called to him from heaven” – giving the intervening passage the look of a later insertion; these verses, furthermore, suddenly introduce the name Yahweh into a narrative which otherwise employs Elohim;²⁵ if Abraham assures his servants that “we” (namely, he and Isaac) will go and sacrifice and return, only Abraham is actually said to return (v.19); and this interpolation provides the animal substitute itself. In the story’s original version, then, God’s congratulatory declaration to his god-fearing servant might well have had a more disturbing, literal meaning: “because you have done this thing and have not withheld your son, your only one” (22:16). Even so, the original version of the story would still have been written in a setting where human sacrifice was no longer the norm, so that it would still presuppose, *qua* etiology, the practice of substitutionary sacrifice. Our venerable ancestor Abraham, the writer would be affirming, actually offered up his son, whereas we need only offer an animal substitute. In light of the allusion in Exodus 24 to Genesis 22, the burnt offerings made during the covenant ceremony at Horeb should be interpreted as a type of ritual re-enactment of Abraham’s supreme and foundational sacrifice. This might help explain an unusual detail in the covenant ceremony: viz., the splattering of blood on not only the altar, but the people as well.²⁶ In P, the blood purifies the altar on behalf of the people; here, the “blood of the covenant” marks the people themselves as the beneficiaries of the animal’s substitutionary death, thus sealing the covenant that, in turn, fulfills the promise God made centuries earlier to his god-fearing servant, Abraham.

Now, it is sometimes argued that sacrifice in general began as human sacrifice and only later evolved (whether dialectically or historically) into substitutionary sacrifice – René Girard

comes to mind.²⁷ However, even if one were to accept such theories of the “origin” of sacrifice,²⁸ it still would not tell us how the biblical writers themselves viewed sacrifice. According to both P and J, the sacrificer offers up a material good to God. J for his part betrays no interest in human sacrifice, per se. Meanwhile, P explicitly posits, as a type of axiom, that human blood should never be spilled, “for God made humankind in his own image” (Gen 9:6). Human sacrifice thus constitutes an intrinsically abominable act for P, so that it is quite simply unthinkable for P to hold it up as some sort of underlying ideal, of which the sacrifice of an animal substitute would constitute a mere shadow. This, however, is precisely the view E espouses. Elohim is an implacable absolute being who is beyond good and evil. Recall the tautology he later offers to Moses in place of a name: “I am what I am,” as if no quality could be predicated of this transcendent subject. Human life is thus subject to divine negation. Fortunately, perhaps precisely because of Abraham’s obedience, God comes to accept animal substitutes.

If Propp and Friedman are correct in attributing to E the “ransom” (padah) of firstborns described in Exod 13:11-16,²⁹ we find here an interesting addendum to E’s theory of substitutory sacrifice. Because Elohim killed the firstborn of Egypt on that first passover night, “therefore I sacrifice [zobeah] every male who opens the womb, and I ransom [’epdeh] every firstborn of my sons” (13:15; 22:29ff; cf 34:19f [J]). The final plague, in other words, created a debt to divine negation – “the Destroyer” (12:23) – so that the life of every firstborn Israelite male – not unlike Isaac’s – is forfeit to Elohim, i.e., subject to death. But human sacrifice being no longer acceptable, these are “ransomed” instead through the sacrifice of an animal substitute (13:13).³⁰ It is interesting to compare E’s “ransom” with P’s sublimated version thereof described in Numbers 3: the Levites substitute (through service, not death) for the firstborn of Israel (Num 3:11ff); for those remaining Israelites not covered by Levite substitutes, a monetary “ransom” suffices (Num 3:47; see also 18:15ff).

Finally, Deuteronomic law, in stark contrast to the three sources of the Tetrateuch, “disenchants” sacrifice altogether, to use Weber’s felicitous term. That is, it functions neither as a metaphysical transaction – whether as purification or as ransom – nor as a material exchange of gifts – as though humans were capable of offering God anything that he might somehow need or enjoy. It is merely an expression of thanksgiving on the sacrificer’s part, a ritual of “rejoicing before Yahweh” (Deut 12:7,12,18; 15:19ff.). One might argue that some notion of “rent” owed to God underlies D’s sacrifices – for Yahweh has given them land and peace and blessings (12:7,10) – but these material goods are in no way described as accruing to God. Rather, it is to the Levites that a portion thereof is given, since they have “no portion or inheritance with you” (v12).

Each source thus conceives of sacrifice in relation to its own distinct vision. J’s sacrifice, invented by humans in the primeval period, corresponds to the fact that the name Yahweh is known already to Eve, the “mother of all living” (3:20) – a humanistic, almost universalist conception of religion. Sacrifice for P, conversely, is an esoteric ritual revealed by Yahweh at the appropriate time, just as God’s proper name is revealed only in the time of Moses – not long before the first passover, I might add (Exod 6:2-8). E takes divine esotericism in a radically different direction. Elohim is an implacable inhuman being, who gradually reveals himself in stages: Jacob at the very moment of being renamed Israel seeks to learn God’s name, only to be rebuffed (Gen 32:30); Moses, in the fullness of time, learns at long last the Tetragrammaton (Exod 3:13-15); then, after the covenant ceremony atop the mountain of God, Israel’s leaders actually “envision” (wayyeh^hezu) Elohim (24:11). All of this is made possible by Abraham’s “fear” of Elohim, by the sacrifice (or near sacrifice) of Isaac, and the subsequent establishment of substitutionary sacrifice. Finally, D’s denatured sacrifice is only fitting for a God who merely deigns to “cause his name to dwell” in the temple.

NOTES

1. NOTE: See Knohl 192ff on inaugural sacrifices in PT and HS; 63-66 on construction of tabernacle. Lev 8-9 (PT) = inauguration of the tabernacle. Lev 6:12f = eternal flame
2. Julius Wellhausen, *Prolegomena to the History of Israel* (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), 52.
3. Israel Knohl, *The Sanctuary of Silence* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1995).
4. One can thus trace the notion of purification – ultimately of atonement – all the way back to the Priestly accounts of creation and the flood. If P's creation culminates in a divine affirmation: "And God saw all that he had done, and look, it was very good" (Gen 1:31), by the time of Noah, "all flesh," according to P, had "corrupted its way upon the earth" (6:12), so that, in a clear echo of creation's climax, we are told: "And God saw the earth, and look, it was corrupted." P's flood thus purifies the earth, washing away this "corruption" – apparently caused by "violence" (6:13) – and disposing of it into the open seas, just as the live goat designated for Azazel would "bear" the sins of the camp away into the wilderness (Lev 16:21-22). See David P. Wright, *The Disposal of Impurity* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987)15-74.
5. Knohl attributes the Priestly passover ritual in Exodus 12 to HS: see *Sanctuary*, 19-23, 52.
6. See Propp's meticulous discussion of "The Priestly Pesah" in 1.448-51.
7. Thus, Wright identifies passover as one of the "lesser holy offerings," in that "laypersons may eat" of them (235). Propp relatedly observes, apropos of the requirement that it be "fire-roasted," that "P attempts to maximize the resemblance of the paschal meal to an offering, without using the sacrificial terms 'olah, zebah or qorban" (1.396). True, passover will later be described as a "qorban" that is "offered" [*haqrib*] to God (Num 9:7). But the commemoration of passover represents the priestly appropriation of the rite, opposed to the tradition of the passover in Egypt (see Propp, 1.448-9).
8. Knohl, *Sanctuary*, 222-4.
9. It is also worth noting that in some cases, the priests eat some of the meat of the sin offering, (Lev 5:13; 6:25-30; 10:16-20), which would parallel in part the passover meal. It has even been argued that eating the sin offering has an expiatory function. Thus, Milgrom, building upon observations made by Yehezkiel Kaufmann, observes that because the sin offerings are "purificatory, they are dangerous and must be eliminated either by eating or by burning"; and as Lev 10:17b indicates, by eating the sin offering, the priests "thereby destroy Israel's sins" (Milgrom 1.261f; citing Kaufmann 1937-56: 1.568f).
10. There is a resemblance to the burnt offerings prescribed and performed in various passages: Exod 29:16-18; Lev 1:8-9, 12-13; 8:20-21; 9:13-14. But this takes place entirely at the altar, where it is "burnt to smoke" (*hiqṭir*) as a "pleasing odor" (1:9), not "burnt [*śarap*] with fire," which verb P uses for "nonsacrificial incineration" (Milgrom 1.161). Milgrom draws a close parallel between the sin offering and the red heifer ritual (Num 19:5), but the latter has not been dissected in the same way, so it is not burnt in the same configuration (1.273).
11. Propp thus speculates regarding the biblical (not just Priestly) passover that: "Pesah purifies the doorway" (1.437), with the doorway functioning as an altar.
12. By the same logic, Aaron, during his ordination, must not leave the tent of meeting for seven days, lest he die (Lev 8:31-35); even after the untimely death of his sons, Nadab and Abihu, Moses insists that he remain within, lest he die (10:7). See Wright 235-43 on "The Pure Place" of lay rituals. Wright 241f on Ezek and Temple Scroll.
13. As Propp observes: "Thus 12:9 may permit Israel, this once, to eat Yahweh's food. But the intent of 12:9 is more likely that the animal is to be roasted intact" (1.396). See also Susan

Niditch, *Folklore and the Hebrew Bible* (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2004), 60. (Keep in mind, however, that there is no indication in P, or biblical prose in general, that God derives nourishment from sacrifice, or even has any appetite whatsoever; God's "food" is a dead metaphor.) However, given the semantic distinction Milgrom draws attention to between "burnt to smoke" (*hiqṭir*) and "burnt [*śarap*] with fire," it seems we must interpret the passover meal as a ritual disposal. Note as well the similarity of the passover disposal and that of the sin offering, in which the carcass of the sin offering to be burned with fire is referred to as "the whole bull" (Lev 4:12).

14. Hendel, "Sacrifice as a Cultural System: The Ritual Symbolism of Exodus 24,3-8," *ZAW* 101 (1989): 384-87; see also Niditch, *Folklore*, 58-60; and Propp 1.439-40. Hendel and Niditch interpret this peculiar detail with respect to the anthropological distinction between nature and culture: roasting in this view corresponds to nature, boiling in a vessel, to culture. I prefer the following distinction. Propp, I have already noted, sees the stipulation of roasting by fire as P's attempt "to maximize the resemblance of the paschal meal to an offering." Fire, in fact, is necessarily the medium for God's "food," in that P conceives of this aspect of sacrifice as transforming the animal into smoke, a "pleasing odor for YHWH"; fire is thus the primary notion, defining divine "food." The general requirement that humans eat meat that has been boiled is thus a derived, secondary notion, defining human food in opposition to divine food.

15. According to Wright, Exod 12:10b is a later editorial gloss: v.10a reflects the original requirement that none of the passover lamb remain until morning; v.10b reflects a relaxing of this stipulation, so that whatever remains be burned in fire (135-8). If so, my interpretation of "fire-roasted" as the midway point of disposal corresponds to this secondary stage. Even then, however, the stipulation that the meat be eaten "fire-roasted" would still assimilate the passover meal with the disposal by fire of the sanctified flesh.

16. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena*, 338-9.

17. See Cross, *CMHE*, 295-300; and Kawashima, "Sources and Redaction," 56-7.

18. Given their relation within the Mosaic covenant, it seems no coincidence that both the ongoing passover and the sabbath rituals constitute commemorations of a singular original event: passover commemorates the exodus from Egypt; sabbath commemorates the creation of the world. However, whereas it is only the blood spilt during the original passover that functions as a sign of the initiation of the covenant, it is the weekly commemoration of God's rest that functions as a sign of the ongoing covenant. Perhaps the dual sign of the Mosaic covenant underlies the link within later Christian ritual between the weekly mass (sabbath) and the Christ's passion (passover).

19. For a general discussion of the connection between circumcision and passover, see Propp 1.452-54. Even the revelation of the sabbath law (Exod 16:22-30) presupposes Israel's prior observance of the passover, insofar as the passover was a prerequisite to leaving Egypt.

20. Propp notes certain temporal paradoxes in his Exodus commentary. One should also consider that P was likely trying to accommodate or appropriate within the Priestly ideology an established ritual practiced by the laity, as well as venerable traditions regarding the eve of the exodus as well; in the same way, P seems to accommodate or appropriate the nazirite vow in Numbers 6.

21. P's divinely revealed system of carefully choreographed ritual prescriptions

22. Mauss, *The Gift* (New York: Norton, 1967), 6-16.

23. Friedman, *Bible with Sources Revealed*, 160.

24. Friedman, *Sources Revealed*, 65.

25. Cf Knohl on Gen 22, *Divine Symphony*, 106-8.

26. David Biale, on unusual blood rite here???
27. Propp entertains the possibility that the “paschal sacrifice was originally vicarious” (1.397f, 434-9).
28. as a general theory of the “origin” of sacrifice – in the way that, say, Marx and Freud have proposed theories of the “origin” of religion – or even a particular theory of the origin of a specific sacrifice
29. Propp 1.373-82; Friedman, *Sources Revealed*.
30. Sacrificial substitution is implied, but not explicit: Propp 1.426f.